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Quite recently, enhancing security against device-attack vulnerability has been theoreti-
cally challenging but also practically important in quantum cryptographic communication.
For dealing with this issue in a general and strict scenario, we design a seemingly-new kind
of quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) in a linear-optical regime, which we call
“preparation-attack-immune QSDC.” We address that in our ‘naive’ analysis, it is quite
formidable to extract even a piece of information of the secret message, and any malicious
eavesdropping attempts will be unsuccessful. The most remarkable feature is that even in the
case where a powerful eavesdropper can peep at all preparation device settings, our protocol
still keeps a high level of security without invoking any additional resources and physical
properties. This novel advantage that we call ‘preparation-attack immunity’ comes from
the simultaneous use of the two degrees of freedom involved in a single-photon (polarization
and spatial modes), which enables one to faithfully deal with the single-photon quantum
superposition nature. Our idea can be generalized to other single-photon based protocols.
PACS numbers:
For several years a great number of quantum communication protocols has been proposed and
studied. However in most cases the security is guaranteed on the condition that the legitimate
communication parties (say, Alice and Bob) can trust the devices to initially prepare the valid in-
formation carriers, i.e., flying qubits [1–3]. For example, in a conventional quantum communication
scheme, the states of the mutually unbiased bases (e.g., eigenstates of σˆz or σˆx) are commonly used
as the information carriers. Then, it should be assumed that Alice and Bob prepare them by using
the trustworthy devices free from connection with any other malicious eavesdropper. However, such
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2an assumption regarding device-trustworthiness or device-reliability cannot always be made due
to the room for possibility of hacking those devices or softwares being compromised beforehand.
The now accepted way to approach this problem is to exploit the Bell inequality violation with
the entanglement distributed between the communicating mates, e.g., in the device-independent
scenarios (see ref. [4], and refs. [5, 6] for recent results). Still, we are far from the faithful design
and realization of such a task, as probably it is quite difficult to generate and distribute the en-
tanglement between far-away places. Thus we feel that it would be fair to find a moderate-step
solution taking into consideration the feasibility of current technology [7, 8].
To deal with such an issue and make our idea general in a strict scenario, we consider here
an important branch of the quantum communication scheme, called quantum secure direct com-
munication (QSDC) [9–17], which allows two parties Alice and Bob to communicate directly in
secret without performing any additional tasks, e.g., a pre-distribution of the secret-keys. The
QSDC scheme has received interest as it appears to be efficient [12, 18, 19] and may result in some
advantages with any distributed quantum tasks [20, 21] or quantum network [22]. Here we note
that QSDC is substantially different from the quantum key distribution (QKD) in which the two
remote users create the private key, and then communicate their messages via classical channel
[23]. The security requirements for QSDC are also stricter than those for QKD (or other quantum
cryptographic schemes), because none of the useful information of the secret message should leak
out to an eavesdropper; once the eavesdropper has already extracted any information of the secrete
message, the QSDC protocol may be of no use even if the eavesdropper can be identified. Thus,
we will present an explicit realization of our idea based on using this QSDC scheme, preserving
the essential content and general applicability.
Keeping the above-described in mind, we design and propose a “preparation-attack-immune
QSDC” in a linear-optical framework. The proposed QSDC scheme runs with the photons moving
along the pathways ‘Alice→ Bob’ and ‘Bob→ Alice.’ More specifically, a single-photon generated
on Bob’s side is thrown to Alice, and it can be reflected—without being assisted by the quantum
memory—to Bob with a bit of Alice’s message and/or the potential warning on the existence of
any malicious eavesdropper, say Eve. The photon could also be caught in one of Alice’s detectors,
in which this case, Alice and Bob get another chance to detect Eve. On the basis of the naive
analysis, we address that it is probabilistically unsuccessful and impractical to eavesdrop on even
one bit of the message due to the complications of the protocol. In particular, the most remarkable
feature is that the security of our protocol is not seriously damaged even considering a powerful
Eve who can look at Bob’s whole preparation settings, whereas other single-photon based QSDC
3schemes (and most existing quantum cryptographic protocols) may become insecure. This new
kind of advantage, called preparation-attack immunity, originates from the simultaneous use of the
two degrees of freedom of the single-photon that are the polarization and path modes. We indicate
that our idea can be generalized to other single-photon based QKD protocols.
RESULTS
First, we briefly describe the scenario of our QSDC scheme. Alice intends to securely deliver
a secret message to Bob. The scenario and method follows those of the conventional QSDC
schemes designed based on using the single-particle quantum carriers. Bob generates a quantum
particle in a state ∈ {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉} and sends it to Alice through a quantum channel C. Here,
|±〉 = (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2. Then, Alice encodes a bit of her message by applying a unitary ∈ {1ˆ , σˆy}
(we call “message operation” hereafter) to the incoming particle and reflects it to Bob through the
same channel C. Whether or not the state of the returning particle is flipped corresponds to the
bit of the message from Alice: ‘0’ when Alice acts 1ˆ , and otherwise, ‘1’ when Alice does σˆy. In
this work, we have shown that an eavesdropper, Eve, cannot decode the message bits even in the
case where all information of Bob’s preparation and encoding is leaked, in contrast to the previous
schemes [13, 24, 25]—in this sense, we call our scheme “preparation-attack-immune QSDC.”
A. Linear-optical setting.
We then describe the linear-optical setting of our preparation-attack-immune QSDC protocol.
Firstly, let us describe the setup which consists of a single-photon source/detector, beam-splitter
(BS), polarization beam-splitter (PBS), and quarter/half wave-plates (QWP/HWP) [see Fig. 1(a)].
Bob has a single-photon preparation module, and a ‘tunable’ beam-splitter (T-BS) which is nothing
but a Mach-Zehnder interferometer having a tunable phase ϕ ∈ {0, pi2 , 3pi2 , pi} [see Fig. 1(b)] [26].
A polarization analyzer DB is also equipped on Bob’s side to decode the bits of Alice’s message
or to check for the existence of Eve’s eavesdropping. On the other hand, Alice has four H/V
polarization detection modules, denoted by DA,n (n = 1, 2, 3, 4). Alice also employs the quarter
wave-plate QWP(ϑ) and a mirror to implement a message operation 1ˆ or σˆy, where ϑ are the
real controllable parameters (i.e., rotation angles) of QWP. Here we assume that ϑ can precisely
be controlled to be either pi2 or
pi
4 for the implementations of 1ˆ and σˆy, respectively (as will be
described later). This module is placed on each pathway (hereafter called “arm”). We represent
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FIG. 1: (a) The linear-optical setting of our preparation-attack-immune QSDC. Bob owns two modules of
QWP-HWP-QWP: One is used to prepare a single-photon in a specific polarized state ∈ {|H〉 , |V 〉 , |D〉 , |A〉},
and the other is responsible for the analysis of the returning photon. (b) Bob also has a ‘tunable’ beam-
splitter (T-BS) to control the photon pathways: R (right), L (left), or their superposition. (c) Alice equips
each arm (R or L) with a QWP and a mirror to implement the message operations ∈ {1ˆ , σˆy} [as in Eq. (1)].
The polarization detection modules DA,n (n = 1, 2, 3, 4) are placed in Alice’s side to find any eavesdropper
(if any). Alice and Bob also employ a (classical) public channel Cpublic. Bob prepares a photon and throws it
to Alice. The photon can be captured in one of Alice’s detecting modules DA,n (n = 1, 2, 3, 4) or be reflected
to Bob taking a bit of Alice’s message (see the main text for detailed analyses).
the message operations as UˆA,x, where x = R,L (R: right, L: left) denotes the direction in which
the arm is placed. Alice and Bob are also allowed to use a (classical) public channel Cpublic.
B. Protocol.
Our protocol runs as follows: First, Bob declares the commencement to Alice through Cpublic,
and Alice encodes a bit of her message by setting ϑ ∈ {pi2 , pi4} of QWP in either right or left arm
5(say, R-arm or L-arm). In other words, Alice sets her QWPs to be either(
UˆA,R ∈
{
1ˆ , σˆy
}
& UˆA,L = 1ˆ
)
or
(
UˆA,R = 1ˆ & UˆA,L ∈
{
1ˆ , σˆy
})
. (1)
To provide a more detailed explanation, the polarization of the photon experiencing the QWP
(twice) with the mirror in Alice’s module evolves as |P〉 QWP(ϑ)-σˆz-QWP(−ϑ)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ |P ′〉, where P,P ′ ∈
{H,V,D,A} and the Pauli matrix σˆz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
corresponds to the operation of the mirror that
changes the ordinary axis of the polarization [see Fig. 1(c)]. Here, the operation of QWP(ϑ) is
given as
UˆQWP(ϑ) =
1√
2
1− i cos 2ϑ −i sin 2ϑ
−i sin 2ϑ 1 + i cos 2ϑ
 . (2)
Then, the general form of the message operation can be represented as
UˆA, (R or L) = UˆQWP(−ϑ)σˆzUˆQWP(ϑ)
= −i
 cos 2ϑ sin 2ϑ
− sin 2ϑ cos 2ϑ
 . (3)
Therefore we can implement the message operation UˆA, (R or L) as in Eq. (1) (ignoring the global
phase factor), such that
UˆA, (R or L) =
 1ˆ if Alice sets ϑ = pi2 ,σˆy if Alice sets ϑ = pi4 . (4)
After finishing their ready-sign, Bob generates a single photon ∈ {|H〉 , |V 〉 , |D〉 , |A〉} (at random),
where |D〉 = (|H〉+ |V 〉) /√2 and |A〉 = (|H〉 − |V 〉) /√2. Such an arbitrary preparation can
generally be done by a combination of QWP-HWP-QWP (However, without loss of generality,
only two wave-plates, QWP-HWP, would suffice in our case) [27]. Then, Bob sends the prepared
photon to Alice. Here Bob chooses one of the four possible ways to transmit the photon, each of
which is determined by the setting ϕ ∈ {0, pi2 , 3pi2 , pi} of T-BS. More specifically, if Bob sets ϕ = 0
or ϕ = pi, then the photon passing through T-BS is either to be transmitted toward R-arm or to be
reflected toward L-arm deterministically. On the other hand, if ϕ = pi2 or ϕ =
3pi
2 , the photon can
travel in both R-arm and L-arm, simultaneously; in other words, here the two paths are superposed
in these cases. In fact, such a “superposition path” plays an important role in our protocol.
6C. Photon traveling paths.
From now on we describe the process and all occurring events in the two kinds of photon travel
paths.
(i) Deterministic path (ϕ = 0 and ϕ = pi). – We first consider that the prepared photon goes
along the deterministic paths toward either R-arm (i.e., ϕ = 0) or L-arm (i.e., ϕ = pi). Let us first
consider that the traveling photon passes through the beam-splitter BS1 or BS2 for each ϕ-setting.
In such settings, Bob can receive back the reflected photon. Note that if ϕ = 0 or ϕ = pi, the
reflected photon must come into the analyzer due to the trait of T-BS. In this case, Bob publicly
announces only the fact that the photon returns back, and Alice announces which arm (R or L)
the valid message operation is carried out in. Here, if the initial path of the photon is matched to
the arm announced by Alice, Bob can decode the bit of Alice’s message by analyzing whether the
initially prepared polarization is flipped or not. Otherwise, in the not-matched case, the measured
polarization in Bob’s analyzer is to be used to check if there exists Eve’s eavesdropping in the
way of Bob → Alice or Alice → Bob, because the polarization should be unchanged in this case.
Another possibility when ϕ = 0 or ϕ = pi is that the reflected photon could also be caught by
DA,1 placed in R-arm (when ϕ = 0) or by DA,2 placed in L-arm (when ϕ = pi). Then, Alice can
presume the original polarization of the incoming photon (before the message operation is carried
out) using Uˆ †A,R or Uˆ
†
A,L. Alice announces the detector number n (1 or 2) and the presumed original
polarization through Cpublic. Then, Bob can check if Eve disturbed the photon moving in the way
of Bob→ Alice. If the detector announced by Alice is placed on an invalid arm for the ϕ-setting, it
is indicative of Eve’s existence. Here, if the photon is initially prepared as |H〉 or |V 〉, Bob can do
an additional check by comparing the initially prepared polarizations with the later ones identified
by DA,1 or DA,2. Other possibilities are that the photon is detected in DA,3 or DA,4. In such cases,
Bob can check if the initial state has been altered when his original preparation was |H〉 or |V 〉.
(ii) Superposition path (ϕ = pi2 and ϕ =
3pi
2 ). – We investigate the case where the prepared
photon follows the superposition path. Firstly, let us consider that the photon can be measured
in DA,3 or DA,4. In these two cases, Alice announces the detector number n and the measured
polarization, and then Bob checks the possible existence of Eve who could be in the way of Bob
→ Alice by analyzing the announced number n. Here, note that the photon has to have appeared
in DA,3 when ϕ =
pi
2 and in DA,4 when ϕ =
3pi
2 . If the initial state is in |H〉 or |V 〉, Bob does
the additional check of whether the polarization is altered. We can also consider that the photon
touches neither DA,3 nor DA,4, but is detected in DA,1 or DA,2. In that case, Alice announces
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FIG. 2: All possible events of a trial of our scheme is presented with respect to (a) deterministic and (b)
superposition paths. Depending on the chosen ϕ ∈ {0, pi2 , 3pi2 , pi}, the photon is supposed to have appeared in
one of Alice’s detection modules DA,n (n = 1, 2, 3, 4), or reflected toward Bob again following the pathways
out of the Alice’s detection modules. The photon could also be discarded without any contribution to the
detection process.
her detection (the number n and the presumed Bob’s original polarization) according to the rule
described in (i). Then Bob has a chance to check the alteration of the polarization, if the photon is
initially prepared as |H〉 or |V 〉. The last possibility is that the photon returns back after passing
through all of Alice’s detectors. In this case, the photon would just be discarded.
For the single trial described as in the above (i) or (ii), we present a schematic diagram of all
possible events in Fig. 2. Alice and Bob repeat the trials until the full message is transmitted with
no indication of external alterations.
D. Event probabilities.
First we evaluate the event probabilities (by observing Fig. 2) and make the following analyses
not taking into account the channel errors and imperfections of the implementing devices. The
photon delivers a bit of Alice’s message with probability Pmessage =
1
16 , or is used to detect Eve
with probability PEve-check =
5
8 . The photon could be wasted with probability Pdiscard =
5
16 , giving
no contribution. Here, it is worth noting that it is possible to reduce the overall time to complete
the protocol by increasing the probability Pmessage of the message encoding. It can actually be
done by favorably dialing the reflectance r (or the transmittance t = 1 − r) of the beam-splitters
BS1 and BS2, instead of using a conventional 50:50 (i.e., r = t =
1
2). To show this more explicitly,
we can use the mappings of the photon creation operators in each modes with respect to ϕ:
8aˆ†T-BS,R → (1− r)× (- reflected toward Bob & measured -)
+
√
r (1− r)aˆ†BS1,DA,1 +
√
r
2
(
aˆ†BS3,DA,3 − aˆ
†
BS3,DA,4
)
(for ϕ = 0) ,(
aˆ†T-BS,R + aˆ
†
T-BS,L
)
√
2
→ (1− r)× (- reflected toward Bob & discarded -)
+
√
r (1− r)
2
(
aˆ†BS1,DA,1 + aˆ
†
BS2,DA,2
)
−√raˆ†BS3,DA,4
(
for ϕ =
pi
2
)
,(
aˆ†T-BS,R − aˆ†T-BS,L
)
√
2
→ (1− r)× (- reflected toward Bob & discarded -)
−
√
r (1− r)
2
(
aˆ†BS1,DA,1 − aˆ
†
BS2,DA,2
)
−√raˆ†BS3,DA,3
(
for ϕ =
3
2
pi
)
,
aˆ†T-BS,L → − (1− r)× (- reflected toward Bob & measured -)
+
√
r (1− r)aˆ†BS2,DA,2 −
√
r
2
(
aˆ†BS3,DA,3 + aˆ
†
BS3,DA,4
)
(for ϕ = pi) . (5)
where aˆ†T-BS,R and aˆ
†
T-BS,L create a photon as the output of T-BS traveling along R-arm and L-
arm; aˆ†BSj ,DA,k denotes the operator to create an output photon from BSj (j = 1, 2, 3) toward
DA,k (k = 1, 2, 3, 4). From the mappings in Eq. (A1), we can give the general form of the event
probabilities (see Sec. S1 of the Supplementary Information for detailed derivations),
Pmessage =
(1− r)2
4
,
PEve-check =
1 + 4r − 2r2
4
,
Pdiscard =
2− 2r + r2
4
, (6)
in which we assumed that the probabilities of choosing ϕ ∈ {0, pi2 , 3pi2 , pi} are all 14 . Then, we can
make the following observation: First, if we do not use BS1 and BS2 (or equivalently, r = 0), Alice
and Bob have Pmessage =
1
4 , PEve-check =
1
4 , and Pdiscard =
1
2 . However, as Bob does not need to use
the superposition path in this case, the actual event probabilities are Pmessage =
1
2 , PEve-check =
1
2 ,
and Pdiscard = 0. Such a setting, of course, runs effectively and is efficient in the sense that there
are no discarded photons. In fact, this setting can be regarded as a combination of two BB84
protocols using T-BS. However, note that it may become insecure against the eavesdropping of
Eve who can peep at Bob’s polarization encoding. This means that the critical advantage, i.e.,
the preparation-attack immunity (will be described below), cannot be achieved just by adding up
the effective arms. Next, we can also consider a case where Alice replaces BS1 and BS2 to the
reflecting mirrors (or equivalently, r = 1). In this case, Alice cannot encode her bit-message on the
9photon with Pmessage = 0. Bob then does not need to use the deterministic paths, and the photon
is not wasted with PEve-check = 1. Such a setting can be used just to check the security before the
full-scale message communication.
E. Impracticality of eavesdropping.
For the analysis of security, we assume here that there exists a malicious Eve who attempts to
eavesdrop on the secret message. We discuss that an attempt by Eve will be unsuccessful due to
the following complications:
(C.1) Firstly, it is assumed that the critical information, such as the initial photon polarization,
the setting of ϕ, and the position of valid message operation (to be either R or L), are not
opened.
(C.2) In case Bob prepares |H〉 or |V 〉, Eve who alters the polarization of the photon moving ‘Bob
→ Alice’ can be found in DA,n (n = 1, 2, 3, 4). Eve who does it in the way of ‘Alice → Bob’
can also be detected by Bob’s analyzer DB. .
(C.3) Alice and Bob can sense Eve when the photon has appeared in an invalid arm for the initial
ϕ-settings. In particular, we note that the use of the superposition paths allows to detect
even a more powerful Eve who can peep Bob’s initial preparation.
Based on the above-described complications (C.1)-(C.3), it is believed that Eve’s eavesdropping
is probabilistically unsuccessful and impractical.
Nevertheless, we should always consider the existence of a potential Eve who has a reasonable
(powerful) strategy to carry out the eavesdropping within the rules of quantum theory. Thus, we
now perform a ‘naive’ theoretical analysis just to provide a convincing proof of the validity and
security of our QSDC protocol. For the purpose, our analysis is focused on the Eve’s eavesdropping
probability that allows to estimate the amount of information Eve has gained. First, let us assume
that Eve can adopt the primitive strategy of disturbing the moving photon (e.g., an intercepting-
and-resending attack) on the way of ‘Bob → Alice’ and ‘Alice → Bob.’ In such a strategy, Eve
needs to see the polarization of the photon moving both forward (i.e., ‘Bob→ Alice’) and backward
(i.e., ‘Alice→ Bob’) ways. Thus, Eve would place her own detecting modules DEve,R and DEve,L in
between T-BS and Alice. Here, DEve,R and DEve,L are set to be either H/V or D/A measurement.
Then, Eve is supposed to find a photon in either DEve,R or DEve,L. After the analysis of the
10
measured photon, Eve should resend the photon (possibily randomly polarized) without attracting
the attention of Alice and/or Bob. Here it is assumed that Eve already understands the protocol.
Then, by considering all possible events described in Fig. 2, we can evaluate the probability that
Eve successfully eavesdrops on one bit of the message with respect to the reflectivity r of the
general beam-splitters BS1 and BS2 as below:
Peavesdropping =
1
12288
(1− r)2 (40− 23r + 7r2) . (7)
This probability Peavesdropping is to be ' 0.0019 when r = 0. Peavesdropping becomes 0 when r = 1,
which intuitively makes sense as Alice cannot encode her message in this case. When r = 12 ,
the probability Peavesdropping is as small as ' 0.0006, which indicates the impracticality of the
eavesdropping. Here, one can also consider a more favorable strategy for the eavesdropping, namely
a strategy of disturbing only the deterministic paths since the photon traveling along the superposed
paths does not carry any message information. Such a strategy is actually possible if Eve can see
Bob’s initial ϕ-setting. Then, the eavesdropping probability Peavesdropping is
Peavesdropping =
1
8192
(1− r)2 (77− 6r + r2) , (8)
which is a bit higher than Eq. (7), however still vanishingly small; Peavesdropping ' 0.0094 when
r = 0 and Peavesdropping ' 0.0023 when r = 12 . Note here that even in such cases, Eve cannot verify
whether or not her eavesdropping was successful.
We then assume that Eve owns a strategy to estimate the polarizations of Bob’s initial photon,
partially relaxing the complication (C.1). Such a clever Eve may try to extract the information
of the initial polarizations by looking at the classical parameters (the angles of the wave-plates)
or softwares of Bob’s devices UˆB. In such a case, nearly all existing QSDC (or similar quantum
cryptographic) protocols based on the single-photon carriers may become insecure. However, our
scheme is not damaged due to the use of the superposition path. Actually, we calculate that
even for a more powerful Eve who can completely see Bob’s initial polarization, the probability of
eavesdropping one valid message-bit is still small. More explicitly, the eavesdropping probability
Peavesdropping is given by
Peavesdropping =
1
48
(1− r)2 (12− 7r + 3r2) , (9)
which is higher than those in the above case in Eq. (7), but still quite small. In fact, the probability
is as small as' 0.0481 when r = 12 . The probability becomes 0.25 when r = 0, in which the situation
is exactly the same as that of the BB84 protocol. When r = 1, the probability is equal to 0. Note
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that Eve also still cannot verify her success in this case. Therefore, it is impractical to eavesdrop
on the full message even with the ability to peep at Bob’s initial polarization. We note again that
such an advantage cannot be found in a typical (classical) way of just adding the possible pathways
(in our case, the arms) to confuse Eve.
For further analysis, we consider the case of a super-Eve who can attack Bob’s whole preparation
settings (both the initial polarization and ϕ-setting). In this case our protocol cannot be considered
secure any more. Eve will measure the initial polarization of the photon traveling ‘Bob → Alice’
only for the deterministic path (i.e., when ϕ = 0 and ϕ = pi), and will try to extract the bit-
message by disturbing the returning photon (in the way of ‘Alice → Bob’) with the measurement
bases oriented along Bob’s initial polarization axis. Such a super-Eve can reproduce the valid
outcomes that would have appeared in Bob’s analyzer. Thus, in this case, the superposed paths
(the options ϕ = pi2 and ϕ =
3
2pi) are useless. However, Alice and Bob can detect even this super-
eavesdropper by subtly-modifying the protocol as follows: Alice adds one more option ϑ = pi8 to
her setting of the message operation as
UˆA, (R or L) =

1ˆ if Alice sets ϑ = pi2 ,
σˆy if Alice sets ϑ =
pi
4 ,
−i√
2
(
1 1−1 1
)
if Alice sets ϑ = pi8 ,
(10)
and Bob’s analyzer is initially set to be either an H/V or D/A measurement in each trial, instead
of matching to the initial setting UˆB (see Fig. 1). Following this modified rule, Alice and Bob now
have a chance to detect the aforementioned super-Eve. More specifically, in the cases that
|H〉 or |V 〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bob’s initial polarization
Bob to Alice−−−−−−−→ |A〉 or |D〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
UˆA, (R or L) with ϑ=
pi
8
Alice to Bob−−−−−−−→
(
D/A measurement
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bob’s analyzer
,
or |D〉 or |A〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bob’s initial polarization
Bob to Alice−−−−−−−→ |H〉 or |V 〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
UˆA, (R or L) with ϑ=
pi
8
Alice to Bob−−−−−−−→
(
H/V measurement
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bob’s analyzer
,(11)
it is inferred that Bob and Alice can be aware of an eavesdropping attempt, because in this case
Eve’s measurement (aligned with the original Bob’s polarization axis) in the way of ‘Alice → Bob’
[specifically, in the green arrows in Fig. 2(a)] can alter the polarization and can generate the invalid
outcomes of Bob’s analyzer. Noting that it is possible for a super-Eve to discriminate the photon
path of the message-encoding event, it is easily found that
Peavesdropping = P
′
message =
2
3
× Pmessage = (1− r)
2
6
, (12)
12
where P ′message is the probability of the message-encoding events defined in the above modified
protocol. Here, Pmessage =
1
4 (1− r)2 [see Eq. (6)] and the factor 23 is introduced due to the
modification of the rule, i.e., adding one more option ϑ = pi8 . However, if there is an extremely
strong eavesdropper who can also attack the random analyzer, then the protocol becomes insecure.
F. A practical strategy of using our protocol.
We here indicate that the above-described type of super-Eve can verify whether one eaves-
dropped bit is a valid message-bit or not in each trial, and super-Eve can extract several bits of
the secret message until she is detected. Thus, on the basis of the above naive analyses, we provide
a practical way of using our QSDC protocol to maximize security advantages. Our basic idea is
to identify the existence of Eve as thoroughly as Alice can, prior to communicating the secret
message-bits. More explicitly, Alice performs the following beforehand tests: [S.1] First, Alice sets
the reflectivity r of her beam-splitters BS1 and BS2 to be 1 without transmitting the photons.
Then, all photons are used to detect Eve. However, Alice and Bob cannot detect super-Eve who
can look at both the initial polarization and ϕ-setting. [S.2] Thus, after the completion of the
aforementioned stage, Alice retunes r to be 0 and transmits all photons toward her setting of the
message operation UˆA, (R or L). Here, Alice chooses only the third ϑ =
pi
8 option in Eq. (10). Then,
Alice and Bob can have a chance to detect super-Eve for the cases of Eq. (11). To make such a
strategy even more effective, Alice adopts these two stages [S.1] and [S.2], by one following the
other, such that
[S.1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
→ [S.2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
→ [S.1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
T3
→ · · · → [S.2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tn
, (13)
where Tj (j = 1, 2, . . . , n) is the time for each stage determined arbitrarily by Alice. Alice com-
mences the message-bit communication with the two options of UˆA, (R or L), as in Eq. (4), and
arbitrarily chosen r ∈ [0, 1), only after verification of the absence of any (super) eavesdropper in
the sequential application of [S.1] and [S.2], as in Eq. (13).
DISCUSSION
We have presented a general idea for achieving preparation-attack immunity by designing and
proposing a novel linear-optical QSDC scheme, called preparation-attack-immune QSDC. In this
protocol, a single-photon generated from Bob’s side is to move through one of the two pathways
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(R-arm and L-arm) deterministically, or to simultaneously travel along the superposition path.
This photon can be detected in Alice’s side, or be reflected (without being assisted by quantum
memory) to Bob after taking a bit of Alice’s message. In the former case Alice and Bob would
share the information of the detection to sense a possible external attack, and in the latter case Bob
would decode the bit of Alice’s message. We then argued that our protocol is secure in the sense
that it would be probabilistically unsuccessful and impractical for any eavesdropper Eve to extract
even a piece of message information due to the complications (C.1)-(C.3). According to our ‘naive’
analysis, the probability that Eve successfully eavesdrops on one bit of the message is less than
' 0.002. The remarkable feature was that Alice and Bob can detect the existence of even a more
powerful Eve who can attack Bob’s initial polarization. In this case where Eve can look at the
initial polarization encoding, the eavesdropping probability is ' 0.048. Analyzing further, if there
is a super-Eve who can attack the whole preparation apparatus (both initial polarization and ϕ-
setting), it is possible to detect her eavesdropping via the subtly-modified rules. Such a new kind of
advantage that is the preparation-attack immunity (as opposed to doubling the encoding capacity
or patching-up the information leakage [28, 29]) was enabled owing to the use of the two-fold photon
degree of freedom which maximizes the single-photon quantum superposition nature. In fact, we
argued that it is impossible to achieve the preparation-attack immunity just by adding up the
effective arms. To our knowledge, this is the first study to the problem of achieving the immunity
against the preparation-attack in the preparation-and-measure QSDC scenario. We believe that
our scheme can be realized with the current linear-optical stuffs, and further provides a strong
motivation to develop the relevant optical technique [30, 31]. Our original idea can be generalized
and developed further to improve the security of other single-photon based QKD protocols.
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Appendix A: Event probabilities
Detailed calculations of the event probabilities in Eq. (6) are presented. First, let us recall the
mapping Eq. (5) of the photon creation operators in each spacial mode:
aˆ†T-BS,R → (1− r)× (- reflected toward Bob & measured -)
+
√
r (1− r)aˆ†BS1,DA,1 +
√
r
2
(
aˆ†BS3,DA,3 − aˆ
†
BS3,DA,4
)
(ϕ = 0) ,(
aˆ†T-BS,R + aˆ
†
T-BS,L
)
√
2
→ (1− r)× (- reflected toward Bob & discarded -)
+
√
r (1− r)
2
(
aˆ†BS1,DA,1 + aˆ
†
BS2,DA,2
)
−√raˆ†BS3,DA,4
(
ϕ =
pi
2
)
,(
aˆ†T-BS,R − aˆ†T-BS,L
)
√
2
→ (1− r)× (- reflected toward Bob & discarded -)
−
√
r (1− r)
2
(
aˆ†BS1,DA,1 − aˆ
†
BS2,DA,2
)
−√raˆ†BS3,DA,3
(
ϕ =
3
2
pi
)
,
aˆ†T-BS,L → − (1− r)× (- reflected toward Bob & measured -)
+
√
r (1− r)aˆ†BS2,DA,2 −
√
r
2
(
aˆ†BS3,DA,3 + aˆ
†
BS3,DA,4
)
(ϕ = pi) . (A1)
where aˆ†T-BS,R and aˆ
†
T-BS,L create a photon as the output of T-BS traveling along R-arm and L-
arm; aˆ†BSj ,DA,k denotes the operator to create an output photon from BSj (j = 1, 2, 3) toward DA,k
(k = 1, 2, 3, 4). Here, we adopted the beam-splitter convention as in Fig. 3.
aˆ†1 →
(√
1− r) aˆ†3 +√raˆ†4
aˆ†2 →
√
raˆ†3 −
(√
1− r) aˆ†4
1
2
3
4
FIG. 3: The mapping of the creation operators aˆ†j (j = 1, 2, 3, 4) in the general beam splitter.
We then describe all possible events and the probabilities of occurrence as below.
• When ϕ = 0 (or ϕ = pi):
Event Occurring Probability Uses
Click Bob’s Analyzer
(1−r)2
2 /
(1−r)2
2 Message Decoding / Eve-Check
Click DA,1 (or DA,2) r(1− r) Eve-Check
Click DA,3, DA,4
r
2/
r
2 Eve-Check / Discarded
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FIG. 4: The graph of the event probabilities Pmessage (red solid), PEve-check (blue dashed), and Pdiscard
(green dotted) are given with respect to r.
• When ϕ = pi2 (or ϕ = 32pi):
Event Occurring Probability Uses
Toward Bob’s analyzer (1− r)2 Discarded
Click DA,4 (or DA,3) r Eve-Check
Click DA,1, DA,2
r(1−r)
2 /
r(1−r)
2 Eve-Check / Discarded
By observing the events and the occurring probabilities described above, we can calculate the
event probabilities as
Pmessage =
1
4
× 2× (1− r)
2
2
=
(1− r)2
4
,
PEve-check =
1
4
× 2×
{[
r(1− r) + r
2
+
(1− r)2
2
]
+
[
r(1− r)
2
+ r
]}
=
1 + 4r − 2r2
4
,
Pdiscard =
1
4
× 2×
{
r
2
+
[
r(1− r)
2
+ (1− r)2
]
+
}
=
2− 2r + r2
4
, (A2)
in which we assumed that the probabilities of choosing ϕ ∈ {0, pi2 , 3pi2 , pi} are all 14 . Note that these
event probabilities can be determined by dialing the reflectivity r (or equivalently, the transmittance
1−r) of Alice’s beam splitters BS1 and BS2. This means that the overall time for the completion of
the task and the security level can simultaneously be controlled by Alice (see the main manuscript).
In Fig. 4, we present the event probabilities with respect to r.
Appendix B: Eve’s successful eavesdropping probabilities
We now present a detailed analysis of the eavesdropping probabilities Eq. (7), Eq. (8), and
Eq. (9). To do this, we first calculate the probabilities of Eve not being discovered by considering
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FIG. 5: The probabilities that Eve can get a bit of Alice’s message are given with respect to r. The red
solid and blue dashed lines denotes the Eve’s successful eavesdropping probabilities for the cases that Eve
cannot get any information and Eve can look at only ϕ-setting, respectively. The green dotted line is the
probability given for Eve who can directly attack Bob’s polarization.
the following three cases. Eve can be discovered her eavesdropping in the ways of (i) Bob → Alice
for superposed path, (ii) Bob→ Alice for deterministic path, and (iii) Alice→ Bob for deterministic
path (we do not need to consider “Alice → Bob for superposed path, because the photon of this
path does not carry the message-bit).
Scenario 1. – First, let us consider the case that Eve does not have any information regarding
Bob’s preparation apparatus. In such a case, we can find that
The probability of Eve not being discovered =

1
384
(
41− 28r + 11r2) for (i),
1
32
(
5r − 3r2) for (ii),
13
128 (1− r)2 for (iii),
(B1)
where all possible events are considered (refer to Fig. 2 in the main manuscript). Thus, the overall
probability that Eve is not detected is given, such that (i) + (ii) + (iii) = 1192(40 − 23r + 7r2).
However, noting that Eve’s successful eavesdropping is valid only for the message-encoding events,
we can find the eavesdropping probability Peavesdropping as
Peavesdropping =
1
16
× Pmessage × 1
192
(40− 23r + 7r2)
=
1
12288
(1− r)2(40− 23r + 7r2), (B2)
where the factor 116 is introduced because Eve cannot verify both the initial polarization and
ϕ-setting.
Scenario 2. – Then, we consider a more powerful Eve who can discriminate the deterministic
superposed paths by looking at Bob’s ϕ-setting. Such an Eve can follow a bit more improved
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strategy, namely a strategy of disturbing only the photons that travel along the deterministic
paths. In this case, Alice and Bob can detect such an Eve with the probabilities as
The probability of Eve not being discovered =

1
2 for (i),
1
32r (5− 3r) for (ii),
13
128 (1− r)2 for (iii),
(B3)
and we can evaluate
Peavesdropping =
1
16
× Pmessage ×
[
(i) + (ii) + (iii)
]
=
1
8192
(1− r)2(77− 6r + r2). (B4)
Here we note that Peavesdropping is larger than Eq. (B2), but still vanishingly small.
Scenario 3. – Lastly, we can also consider another type of powerful Eve who can look at Bob’s
initial polarization encoding, which is a crucial information of the secret message. In this case,
Eve can align her own measurement polarization setting of DEve,R and DEve,L according to Bob’s
original encoding. Such an Eve can also make the valid outcomes appear in Bob’s analyzer. Thus
we can analyze that
The probability of Eve not being discovered =

1
2 for (i),
1
12r (5− 3r) for (ii),
1
2 (1− r)2 for (iii),
(B5)
and
Peavesdropping = Pmessage ×
[
(i) + (ii) + (iii)
]
=
1
48
(1− r)2(12− 7r + 3r2), (B6)
which is much larger than Eq. (B2) and Eq. (B4). Here we indicate that when r = 0, Eve has
Peavesdropping = 0.25. This intuitively makes sense, as in this case the situation is exactly equal to
that of BB84 for Eve. Note further that Peavesdropping becomes small when r → 1. Of course, in
this case, the overall time to complete the task will increase (see the main manuscript). In Fig. 5,
we depict the above described probabilities with respect to r.
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